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Abstract
We incorporate word of mouth (WoM) in a classic Maskin-Riley contracting problem, allowing for referral rewards to senders of WoM. Current customers’ incentives to
engage in WoM can affect the contracting problem of a firm in the presence of positive
externalities of users. We fully characterize the optimal contract scheme and provide
other comparative statics. In particular, we show that offering a free contract is optimal only if the fraction of premium users in the population is small. The reason is
that by offering a free product, the firm can incentivize senders to talk by increasing
expected externalities that they receive and this can (partly) substitute for paying referral rewards only if there are few premium customers. This result is consistent with
the observation that companies that successfully offer freemium contracts oftentimes
have a high percentage of free users.
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y.cam.24@gmail.com; Öry: School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511, e-mail:
aniko.oery@yale.edu. We are grateful to Juan Escobar, Johannes Hörner, Fuhito Kojima, Vineet Kumar, Dina Mayzlin, Takeshi Murooka, Motty Perry, Klaus Schmidt, Jiwoong Shin, Philipp Strack, Steve
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“Cost per acquisition: $233-$388. For a $99 product. Fail.”
—Drew Houston, founder of Dropbox
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Introduction

When Dropbox went public in 2009 without offering a referral reward and hiding its free trial
option, costs per acquisition were more than 200 dollars for a 99 dollar product. In April
2010, Dropbox completely changed its strategy by starting its referral program, increasing
visibility of its free 2 GB option, and introducing a sharing option. All in all, this led
to 2.8 million direct referral invites within 30 days (Houston (2010)). Companies such as
Uber, Amtrak and many others, too, have offered various referral programs to date. For
example, Uber doubled referral credits for the new year in 2014 which they announced on
UBER Newsroom (2014). Despite the prevalence of incentive schemes to encourage WoM,
the theoretical literature on WoM and contracting, besides a few exceptions that we will
discuss later, has thus far largely ignored the incentives to talk and has instead focused on
the mechanical processes that model the spread of information.The objective of this paper is
to investigate the question of how firms should encourage customers to engage in WoM and
how the optimal contract scheme, in particular the use of free contracts and referral rewards,
interact with network externalities in this context.
In order to find the optimal incentive scheme, it is crucial to understand why people
talk.1 Senders of information (existing customers) face a tradeoff generated by three actors
in the market — themselves, the receivers (potential new customers), and the firm. On the
one hand, there are many reasons why talking is costly: senders incur opportunity costs
of talking (Lee et al., 2013), and/or they may feel psychological barriers. On the other
hand, senders can benefit from advertising the product they use: they can receive referral
rewards from the firm, while receivers generate positive externalities. Such an externality
1

Berger (2014) surveys the behavioral studies that examine why people talk, and argues that people’s
motivation is self-serving, even without their awareness. See also Berger and Schwartz (2011) for a field
experiment on the psychological drivers of WoM.
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can be a real value of social usage or psychological benefit from having convinced a friend
to use the same product (Campbell et al., 2015). The sender may also benefit from the
continuation value in a repeated relationship with the receiver. Whether the sender can
enjoy such externalities depends on whether the receiver uses the product, and the firm can
affect the likelihood of usage by fine-tuning the menu of contracts offered to the receivers.
Specifically, the firm can increase the expected number of receivers who use the product,
and thus the expected externalities, by offering free contracts. This is because receivers who
would not have purchased the product otherwise will then use it. All in all, each sender
wants to talk if and only if

Cost of talking
{z
}
|

Internal to the sender

≤

Referral
|
{zrewards}
Provided by the firm

+

Expected externalities .
|
{z
}
Generated by the receivers

In this paper, we aim to understand the implication of this tradeoff on the firm’s optimal
contracting scheme. For that purpose, we enrich a classic contracting problem as in Maskin
and Riley (1984) by allowing the number of customers to depend on the referral decision by
the senders of information, who face the aforementioned tradeoff. In the simplest setting in
which cost of talking is homogeneous across agents, we completely characterize the optimal
scheme. It exhibits a rich pattern of the use of referral rewards and free products, depending
on the parameters in the model. Roughly speaking, the model predicts that referral rewards
are used if externalities are low, and free products are used only if the fraction of “premium
users” is low. We also show that, for referral rewards to be used in conjunction with free
contracts, the externalities cannot be too low, although they cannot be too high either. Such
predictions are consistent with observed contracts in reality: Skype (a telecommunication
application with about only 8% of paying customers) uses only free products but not referral
rewards,2 Uber and Amtrak (ground transportation services) use only referral rewards, and
Dropbox (a cloud storage and file synchronization service with a sharing option and about
2

Another product that falls into this category would be LinkedIn (a social networking service with less
than 1% of paying customers (Woirhaye, 2011)
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only 4% of paying customers (Economist, 2012) uses both free products and referral rewards.
The key intuition for these results is the following. If externalities are high, the firm does
not need to provide additional incentives for talking by giving away referral rewards. This is
why rewards are used only when externalities are small. The reason to use free contracts is
to boost up the expected externalities that the sender receives. The “jump” of the expected
externalities is large (and thus effective) only when the fraction of users who would otherwise
not use the product is high and externalities are not too small. This is why free products
are used only when the fraction of high types is small.
The exact tradeoff is more complicated than this. One such complication pertains to the
cost of free products. Note that the discussion so far only describes the magnitude of the
benefit of offering a free product, while ignoring its cost. There are two reasons that such
a strategy is costly. First, the firm incurs a production cost of the free product (which is
low for products such as Skype and Dropbox). Second, it might have to pay an information
rent to high-valuation buyers. This total cost of offering free contracts plays a key role
in fully characterizing the optimal incentive scheme. Another complication is that there is
non-monotonicity of the use of rewards with respect to the size of externalities. That is,
it is possible that the optimal reward changes from positive to zero when externalities are
lowered because free contracts can “substitute” rewards. We formalize what we mean by
substitution, and explain how the two strategies (rewards and free contracts) interact in
characterizing the optimal scheme. This effect results from the aforementioned incentive
constraint of the sender.
To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the first that takes into account
externalities generated by communication in the context of WoM. The existence of such
externalities rationalizes how companies that use free contracts such as Skype and Dropbox
were able to create a buzz for their product, while for markets with lower externalities or a
higher fraction of high valuation buyers, such as providers of transportation (e.g., Uber or
Amtrak), a classic reward program is the optimal strategy. Importantly, existence of exter-
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nalities in our model explains referral programs and free contracts in a unified framework.
It allows us to understand how the two seemingly unrelated popular marketing techniques
interact with each other as part of the optimal marketing mix for a firm.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, analyzes the benchmark case in which there is no cost of talking for senders, and demonstrates some basic
properties that the optimal menu of contracts and referral reward schemes must satisfy. The
main analysis presented in Section 3 is concerned with the case in which the cost of talking
is homogenous across senders. We completely characterize the optimal menu of contracts
and referral reward scheme, and conduct comparative statics. Section 4 discusses various
extensions, robustness checks, and welfare considerations. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are
deferred to the Appendix. The detailed analysis of the model with heterogeneous cost of
talking can be found in the Online Appendix.

1.1

Related Literature

This paper contributes to the literature on WoM management. To the best of our knowledge
there are only two recent papers that are concerned with the question of how the firm can
affect the strategic communication behavior of their customers.3 Our paper is the closest to
Biyalogorsky et al. (2001) who compare the benefits of price reduction and referral programs
in the presence of WoM. In their model, a reduced price offered to the sender of WoM
is beneficial because it makes the sender “delighted” and thereby encourages him to talk.
Depending on the delight threshold, the seller should use one of the two strategies or both.
In contrast, our focus is on WoM in the presence of positive externalities of talking and
our model accommodates menus of contracts. In Campbell et al. (2015), senders talk in
order to affect how they are perceived by the receiver of the information. The perception is
better if the information is more exclusive. Thus, a firm can improve overall awareness of the
product by restricting access to information (i.e., by advertising less). One could interpret
3

See also Godes et al. (2005) for a survey of the literature.
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the positive externalities in our model also as a reduced form of a “self-enhancement motive”
as in their model. Although we discuss advertising in Section 4.5, we focus on the relative
effectiveness of free contracts and referral rewards instead of advertising.
Most of the other theoretical literature on WoM has focused on mechanical processes
of communication in networks. This literature mostly focuses on how characteristics of the
social network affect a firm’s optimal advertising and pricing strategy. Campbell (2012) analyzes the interaction of advertising and pricing.4 Galeotti (2010) is concerned with optimal
pricing when agents without information search for those with information. Galeotti and
Goyal (2009) show that advertising can become more effective in the presence of WoM (i.e.,
WoM and advertising are complements) or it can be less effective because WoM attracts
more people than advertising can (i.e., WoM and advertising are substitutes). All of these
papers consider information transmission processes in which once a link is formed between
two agents, they automatically share information.
Costly communication has been studied in the context of working in teams where moral
hazard problems are present between the sender and receiver, as introduced by Dewatripont
and Tirole (2005). Dewatripont (2006), for example, applies their model to study firms as
communication networks. Instead, our model does not involve moral hazard but a screening
problem, and externalities (which are absent in Dewatripont (2006)) play a key role in
formulating the optimal contracting scheme.
There is also a literature on contracting models in the presence of network effects. Besides
the critical difference that our focus is on how the firm can optimally affect WoM, there is a
subtle difference in the optimal contracts. Csorba (2008) analyzes such a contracting model
with network effects, in which the more the other buyers use the product, the higher the
utility from using the product is.5 He shows that an optimal contract scheme introduces a
distortion at the top because a reduction of the quantity offered to low types should decrease
4

On the empirical side, Godes and Mayzlin (2009) analyze the roles of loyal customers and opinion leaders
in the context of word-of-mouth.
5
See Segal (2003) for a seminal work on this literature. See also Hahn (2003).
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the value of the product to high types. Unlike in his model, we have no distortions at the top
in the optimal contract scheme. The reason is that receivers do not receive externalities from
each other, and that we consider quantity-independent externalities rather than assuming
that the total quantity consumed generates externalities. We discuss the implications of
quantity-dependent externalities in Section 4.3 and show robustness of our results. We do
not consider the case of externalities between receivers themselves given our focus on the
sender’s incentives to talk. Introducing such a feature would not change the qualitative
results on the optimal incentive schemes to encourage WoM.
While the focus of this paper is not to add another rationale for freemium strategies, it
is important to note the connection to the literature on “freemium” strategies. Lee et al.
(2015) empirically analyze the trade-off between growth and monetization under the use of
freemium strategies. In their paper, the value of a free customer is determined by the option
value of switching from a free contract to a premium contract and by the value of referring
a new customer. Our paper shows that there is potentially another value of free contracts,
namely the value of encouraging referrals which has been ignored in previous works.
A recent working paper by Shi et al. (2015) considers a static model of product line
design without WoM when free users generate positive externalities on all premium users.
When the firm can manipulate the amount of externalities enjoyed by customers conditional
on the user type, freemium contracts can arise as an optimal strategy. In contrast, in our
model, there is no manipulation of the size of externalities and the price of the low-type
contracts must be zero because the surplus from selling to the low types is negative. Even
so, the monopolist sells contracts to the low types because free contracts encourage WoM
which attracts premium users.
Besides these mechanisms for free contracts, Shapiro and Varian (1998) has identified
various other reasons: (i) free contracts may be useful in penetration of customers or information transmission about the quality of the product to them, which can induce their
upgrade, (ii) the firm may hope that the free users will refer someone who will end up using
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the premium version,6 (iii) free products attract attention of customers and prevent them
from purchasing the competitors’ products. None of these reasons pertains to the senders’
incentives. Instead, our focus (with regards to free contracts) is on how free contracts help
firms to manage senders’ incentives. Thus, instead of convoluting our model with these other
aspects of free contracts, we aim to isolate the effect of the tradeoff that the senders of information face. Similarly, we do not intend to create a “complete” model that incorporates
all conceivable features that are relevant for firms’ decision making. Instead, the goal of this
paper is to understand how the incentives for WoM can be managed. Our simplification
allows us to isolate the factors pertaining to the encouragement of WoM and to examine the
tradeoffs involved.

2

Model and Preliminaries

2.1

Model

Basics. We consider a monopolist producing a single product at constant marginal cost
c > 0. Senders (male) {1, . . . , N } can inform receivers, (female) {1, . . . , N } about the
existence of the product. The monopolist’s goal is to maximize the expected profit generated
by receivers by offering them a menu of contracts (as in Maskin and Riley (1984)) and, in
addition, offering a referral scheme to senders.
Receivers’ preferences. Each receiver privately observes her type θ ∈ {L, H} that
determines her valuation of the product. It is drawn independently such that a receiver
is of type H with probability α ∈ (0, 1) and of type L otherwise. A type-θ receiver is
associated with a valuation function vθ : R+ → R that assigns to each quantity (or quality)
q her valuation vθ (q). Over the strictly positive domain, i.e., q ∈ (0, ∞), we assume that vθ is
0
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, vH (q) > vL (q), vH
(q) > vL0 (q)
0
for all q and limq→∞ vH
(q) < c. We assume that vH (0) = vL (0) = 0, which can be interpreted
6
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as the utility of the outside option of not using the product at all. We make the following
additional assumptions:
Assumptions.

1. (Minimum quantity for low types) ∃q > 0 such that vL (q) = 0.

2. (No gains from trade with low types) vL0 (q) < c for all q ≥ q.
3. (Gains from trade with high types) There exists a q > 0 such that vH (q) > q · c.
The first assumption can be interpreted as low types incurring some fixed installation
cost of the product, and the low valuation buyer only wanting to start using the product if a
minimum quantity of q > 0 is consumed.7 This assumption together with the normalization
that vL (0) = 0 implies that the function vL is necessarily discontinuous at q = 0.8 The second
assumption captures that there are some consumers who would never use the product if they
were not needed to incentivize WoM. Without the third assumption, the monopolist would
not be able to earn positive profits, so the problem becomes trivial.
Senders’ preferences and WoM technology. First, each sender i observes the monopolist’s choice of menu of contracts and referral scheme (specified below). Then, he privately observes his cost of talking ξi , drawn from an independent and identical distribution
with a cumulative distribution function G : R+ → [0, 1]. We assume that G has at most
finitely many jumps.9 Each sender i then decides whether to inform receiver i or not.10 We
denote sender i’s action by ai ∈ {Refer, Not}, where ai = Refer if sender i refers receiver
i and ai = Not otherwise. If (and only if) receiver i learns about the product, she decides
whether to purchase a contract or not, and whether to consume the product or not upon
purchasing. If receiver i consumes a positive quantity, sender i receives externalities r ≥ 0.11
7

Note that this does not preclude the possibility of positive fixed installation costs for high types.
Recall that continuous differentiability of vL is assumed only on the strictly positive domain.
9
The function G has a jump, for example, when all senders share the same cost, which is the case we
analyze in Section 3.
10
Section 4.6 examines the case in which multiple senders talk to a single receiver.
11
While we set up the problem such that the referred customer does not receive r for notational simplicity,
assuming that they do would not change the essence of our analysis. We discuss this point in Section 4.2.
8
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Monopolist’s problem. As in Maskin and Riley (1984), the monopolist offers a menu of
contracts given by ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH )) ∈ (R × R+ )2 to receivers, where qθ is the quantity type
θ is supposed to buy at a price pθ . Furthermore, she offers a reward scheme R : {L, H} → R+
such that a sender receives R(θ) if he has referred a receiver who purchases the θ-contract.
Rewards are assumed to be nonnegative because otherwise senders would be able to secretly
invite new customers. We assume that the monopolist only receives revenue from new
customers who do not know about the product unless a sender talks to them. In order to
exclusively focus on the senders’ incentive to talk, we assume that the monopolist receives
no revenue from senders. Thus, the monopolist solves
max

{L,H}

pL , pH ∈R, qL ,qH ≥0, R∈R+

EG

N
X
i=1

1{ai =Refer} · α · (pH − qH · c)) + (1 − α) · (pL − qL · c)
|
{z
}
total average profit per referred receiver

− (αR(H) + (1 − α)R(L))

(1)



subject to the incentive compatibility and participation constraints given by
max{vH (qH ), 0} − pH ≥ max{vH (qL ), 0} − pL
max{vL (qL ), 0} − pL ≥ max{vL (qH ), 0} − pH
max{vH (qH ), 0} − pH ≥ 0



(H-type’s IC) 





(L-type’s IC) 

(2)


(H-type’s PC) 





(L-type’s PC) 

max{vL (qL ), 0} − pL ≥ 0
and for all i, ai = Refer if and only if


ξ ≤ r α + (1 − α) · 1{qL >0,vL (qL )≥0} + (αR(H) + (1 − α)R(L)) (Senders’ IC)
Let Π∗ denote the value of this problem. The monopolist chooses contracts given by quantities and prices, while managing WoM. The management of WoM appears as the senders’
incentive compatibility (IC) constraint. The quantity sold to L-type receivers qL affects

WoM by controlling the expected externalities given by r α + (1 − α) · 1{qL >0,vL (qL )≥0} . The
senders’ optimal decision determines the value of the indicator function in the objective
function and thereby controls the number of informed receivers.
9

Let us explain a few assumptions implicit in this formulation. First, as standard in
contract theory, we assume tie-breaking conditions for senders and receivers that are most
favorable for the monopolist. Senders who are indifferent between referring and not will refer,
and receivers that are indifferent between buying and not buying always buy. Second, we
assume that if the buyer purchases a contract (p, q) such that vθ (q) < 0, then the monopolist
cannot “force” the receiver to consume even if she pays the buyer a negative price. Thus, a
type-θ receiver who purchases such a contract enjoys utility max{vθ (q), 0}.

2.2

Benchmark with free WoM

We first consider a benchmark case where G(ξ) = 1 for all ξ ≥ 0, i.e., WoM is costless
and customers are automatically informed about the product. Then, the monopolist simply
solves the classic problem as in Maskin and Riley (1984):

Πclassic ≡

max

pH , pL ∈R qH ,qL ≥0

α · (pH − qH · c) + (1 − α) · (pL − qL · c)

subject to the constraints (2). It is always optimal for the seller not to sell to L-type buyers
∗
0
∗
) = c.
(qH
sold to H-type buyers satisfies vH
such that qL∗ = 0 and the optimal quantity qH
0
(q) < c
Assumption 3, strict concavity, continuous differentiability of vH and limq→∞ vH
∗
∗
)
. The price for high types is given by p∗H = vH (qH
ensure that there is a unique such qH
∗
· c). All in all, we can summarize our
and the maximal static profit is Πclassic = α · (p∗H − qH

findings as follows:

0
∗
vH
(qH
) = c,

2.3

∗
p∗H = vH (qH
),

∗
and Πclassic = α · (p∗H − qH
· c).

Preliminaries

Before proceeding to the main analysis, we present several preliminary results. First, observe
that R(·) affects the monopolist’s optimization problem only through the ex ante expected
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reward R ≡ αR(H) + (1 − α)R(L). Thus, profits are identical for all reward schemes R(·)
that share the same expected value. Formally, this means:
Lemma 1 (Reward Reduction). If a menu of contracts ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH )) ∈ (R × R+ )2
and a reward scheme R∗∗ : {L, H} → R+ solve (1), then the same menu of contracts
((pL , qL ), (pH , qH )) and any reward scheme R : {L, H} → R+ with E[R] = E[R∗∗ ] solve (1).
Despite being a simple observation, this result implies an important feature of the optimization problem faced by the firm. As long as the firm and the senders have the same
expectation about the receivers’ types, there is no reason for the firm to condition their
payment on the purchased contract. Indeed, in Section 4.4 we show that if the senders have
more accurate information about the receivers’ types than the firm, the conclusion of Lemma
1 no longer holds. Thus, the detail of the optimal reward scheme crucially depends on the
senders’ knowledge. We relegate the analysis of this detail to Section 4.4, while here we
consider senders who have the same information about the receiver’s types as the firm does.
Plugging the sender’s IC constraint into the objective function and noting that all senders
share the same IC constraint, Lemma 1 allows us to simplify the problem as follows:
Π∗ =

max

pL ,pH ∈R, qL ,qH ≥0, R∈R+



N · G r α + (1 − α) · 1{qL >0,vL (qL )≥0} + R ·
{z
}
|
probability of talking

(3)



α · (pH − qH · c) + (1 − α) · (pL − qL · c) − R
subject to the constraints (2). We prove the existence of a solution to this problem for
right-continuous functions G with finitely many jumps to accommodate both homogeneous
costs as in the main part of the paper and heterogeneous costs G as considered in Section
4.1. The existence of a solution is not immediate as the objective function is not necessarily
continuous, but right-continuity of G with only finitely many jumps suffices to establish
existence.
Proposition 1 (Existence). The maximization problem (3) subject to (2) has a solution.
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We denote the (non-empty) set of solutions to this problem by

S ⊆ (R × R+ )2 × R+ .

Moreover, for any menu of contracts ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH )) satisfying (2), we denote the expected
profits obtained by a receiver conditional on being informed by

π((pL , qL ), (pH , qH )) = α(pH − qH · c) + (1 − α)(pL − qL · c).

The monopolist can always choose not to sell to anyone and attain zero profits, i.e., Π∗ ≥ 0.
Furthermore, whenever Π∗ = 0 the seller can attain the maximum by inducing no sender
to talk. This can be done by offering unacceptable contracts to receivers and no rewards.12
We, thus, focus the characterization of optimal menu of contracts and rewards programs on
the case when Π∗ > 0.13 The following lemma summarizes some basic properties of optimal
menus of contracts.
Lemma 2. If Π∗ > 0 and ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH ), R) ∈ S, then:
(i) Low types don’t pay: qL ∈ {0, q} and pL = 0.14
∗
(ii) No distortions at the top: qH = qH
.

(iii) No free contracts: If qL = 0, then pH = p∗H .
(iv) Free contracts: If qL = q, then pH = p∗H −

vH (q)
| {z }

≡ p̃∗H .

information rent

Intuitively, the only benefit of selling to L-type receivers is that it increases the probability
of the receiver using the product. Consequently, if a positive quantity is sold to L-type
receivers, then it must be just enough to incentivize usage but no more. Moreover, the
participation constraint of the L-type must be binding (as in Maskin and Riley (1984)).
12

Note that if there is a positive mass of senders with ξ = 0, then by Assumption 3 the seller can attain
strictly positive profits by only selling to H-receivers and offering no reward.
13
In part 1 of Theorem 1, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for Π∗ > 0 to hold.
14
The proof in the Appendix shows that we do not need to restrict prices to be nonnegative in order to
obtain this result.
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Similarly, there are no distortions at the top. Parts (iii) and (iv) follow because the incentive
compatibility constraint of H-type receivers must be binding.
Lemma 2 restricts the set of possible optimal contracts significantly. In particular, it
uniquely pins down the price offered to low types and the quantity offered to high types
whenever Π∗ > 0. At a price of zero for low types, the seller either chooses qL = 0 (no free
contracts) or qL = q (free contracts). A full characterization of optimal contracts requires
us to characterize the optimal reward scheme R and whether free contracts are optimal for
the monopolist. These choices depend on the parameters that have not been used so far:
the cost structure, the magnitude of externalities, and the composition of different types of
buyers.

3

Main Analysis

This section assumes that the cost of talking is homogeneous and equal to ξ > 0 for all
senders, i.e.,

G(ξ) = 1{ξ≤ξ} .

(4)

This simple case allows us to illustrate the main trade-offs. As a robustness check, the
Online Appendix deals with the case of heterogeneous costs in detail. We summarize the
main insights of that analysis in Section 4.

3.1

Characterization of Optimal Scheme

We characterize the optimal contracts in steps. First, we characterize the optimal referral
reward scheme given a menu of contracts satisfying (2) (Lemma 3). Then, we solve for the
optimal menu of contracts (Lemma 4) and finally, use these optimal contracts to derive the
optimal reward using Lemma 3 (Theorem 1).

13


With homogeneous costs of talking, if r α + (1 − α) · 1{qL >0,vL (qL )≥0} + R ≥ ξ, then for
any menu of contracts satisfying the constraints (2), profits are given by π((pL , qL ), (pH , qH ))−
R. Otherwise, profits are zero. Thus, if incentivizing WoM is not more expensive than the
expected profits, the monopolist would like to pay senders just enough to make them talk.
The following lemma formalizes this intuition. Let



h
i 
R∗∗ ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH )) = max ξ − r · α + (1 − α) · 1{qL >0,qL ≥q} , 0 .



|
{z
} 







(5)

expected externalities

Lemma 3 (Referral Program). Suppose G is given by (4). Given contracts (pL , qL ) and
(pH , qH ) satisfying (2) and vH (qH ) ≥ 0, the optimal referral reward is unique as long as
R∗∗ ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH )) < π((pL , qL ), (pH , qH )) and is given by R∗∗ ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH )).
Using Lemma 2 and the formula of the optimal reward function R∗∗ in Lemma 3, we can
determine whether it is optimal to offer free contracts or not, which then pins down the full
optimal menu of contracts.
In interpreting the full characterization, it is instructive to understand what the cost of
offering free contracts is. It is given by the information rent that the firm needs to pay to
vH -buyers (pertaining to the share α of the receivers) and by the cost of producing the free
product (pertaining to the share 1 − α of the receivers). The following variable quantifies
the overall cost of free contracts:

CF ∗ ≡ α

·vH (q)
| {z }

+(1 − α) ·

information rent

c·q
|{z}

.

(6)

production cost of free product

Using this variable, let us first provide a heuristic argument: In order for free contracts to be
optimal, this cost has to be outweighed by the benefit generated by providing the product
to low types, i.e.,

CF ∗ ≤ (1 − α)r,
14

(7)

or equivalently

CF ∗
1−α

≤ r. Notice that

CF ∗
1−α

represents the “break-even externalities” necessary
CF ∗
1−α

to compensate for the cost of free contracts. Moreover,

is increasing in α. The average

profit generated by a receiver if free contracts are offered can be written as

∗
π((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH
)) = Πclassic − CF ∗

The following result shows that, with additional boundary conditions, (7) is also sufficient
to guarantee optimality of free contracts. We denote the set of optimal qL by Q∗∗
L .
Lemma 4 (Free Contract). Suppose G is given by (4). Whenever Π∗ > 0, an optimal
contract to the type-L receiver must satisfy the following:
(i) Let r ∈ [ αξ̄ , ∞). Then, Q∗∗
L = {0} (i.e., it is not optimal to provide free contracts).
¯ ξ̄ ).
(ii) Let r ∈ [ξ,
α
1. (Free contracts) q ∈ Q∗∗
L if and only if

ξ − αr
| {z }

≥ CF ∗ .

(8)

reward w/o free contract

∗
2. (No free contracts) 0 ∈ Q∗∗
L if and only if ξ − αr ≤ CF .

¯
(iii) Let r ∈ [0, ξ).
1. (Free contracts) q ∈ Q∗∗
L if and only if r ≥

CF ∗
.
1−α

2. (No free contracts) 0 ∈ Q∗∗
L if and only if r ≤

CF ∗
.
1−α

The intuition for this lemma is the following. First, there is no need for the seller to
provide any incentives for WoM (i.e., qL = 0) if the cost of talking ξ is smaller than the
lowest expected externalities αr because in that case people talk anyway (Lemma 4 (i)).
¯ ξ̄ ) (Lemma 4 (ii)), then the cost of talking is larger than αr, but free contracts
If r ∈ [ξ,
α
can boost the expected externalities to r ≥ ξ. Then, free contracts are used whenever the
15

referral reward that the seller had to pay without free contracts ξ − αr is larger than the
cost of offering a free contract CF ∗ which is the sum of the information rent and cost of
producing q. Note that in this case, whenever free contracts are offered, the optimal reward
is zero by Lemma 3. Finally, for high costs of talking ξ > r (Lemma 4 (iii)), by Lemma 3 the
seller pays a reward as long as the optimal reward does not exceed expected profits. If free
contracts are offered, the expected externalities can be increased by (1 − α)r. Hence, free
contracts are offered only if this benefit exceeds the cost of production and the information
rent so that r ≥

CF ∗
1−α

as explained above.

Lemmas 2, 3 and 4 pave the way for a full characterization of the optimal menu of
contracts and reward scheme summarized in the following theorem. It shows that the optimal
incentive scheme depends on the market structure given by parameters such as the cost of
production c, the externalities r, the cost of talking ξ, and the fraction of H-type receivers
α.
Theorem 1 (Full Characterization). Suppose G is given by (4).
1. (Positive profits) Π∗ > 0 if and only if


ξ < max Πclassic − CF ∗ + min{r, ξ}, Πclassic + αr .

(9)

For the following cases, assume that (9) is satisfied:
∗
2. (Free vs. no free contracts) There exists ((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH
), R) ∈ S for some R if and

∗ ξ−CF ∗ 
only if r ∈ CF
, α .15
1−α

3. (Rewards vs. no rewards)
∗

∗

∗
(a) (With free contracts) If r ∈ [ CF
, ξ−CF
], then ((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH
), R) ∈ S with
1−α
α

¯ and
R > 0 if and only if r < ξ,
15

If

CF ∗
1−α

>

ξ−CF ∗
,
α

∗

∗

ξ−CF
then [ CF
] = ∅.
1−α ,
α

16

∗

∗

∗
(b) (With no free contracts) If r 6∈ [ CF
, ξ−CF
], then ((0, 0), (p∗H , qH
), R) ∈ S
1−α
α

with R > 0 if and only if r < αξ̄ .
First, it is straightforward that the monopolist should provide no incentives for WoM
either if senders talk anyway because the cost of talking is small (i.e., ξ < αr) or if it is too
expensive because the cost of talking ξ is too large relative to its benefits given in (9). A
necessary condition for free contracts to be optimal is that r is large enough (i.e., r >

CF ∗
).
1−α

An immediate implication is that without any externalities, free contracts are of no value
to the seller. At the same time, free contracts are more effective to encourage WoM than
rewards only if the cost of talking ξ is sufficiently large relative to r (i.e., ξ > CF ∗ + αr
which is derived from the upper bound of r in part 2 of Theorem 1). Otherwise, it is cheaper
to pay a small reward for talking. We discuss comparative statics with respect to α and r
in the next section.
Figure 1 illustrates the different regions in the (ξ, r)-space characterized in Theorem 1 for
√
vH (q) = 2 q, q = 20 (i.e., vH (q) ' 8.94), and for different production costs c and fraction
of H-type receivers α. The left panel shows the different regions for α = 0.2 and c = 0.05
∗
= 400, p∗H = 40), while the middle panel assumes lower cost of production c = 0.025
(i.e., qH
∗
= 1600, p∗H = 80). Comparing these two figures, one can see how low marginal cost
(i.e., qH

of production c gives the seller incentives to encourage WoM (with free contracts and/or
rewards) for high costs of talking ξ.
The rightmost panel of Figure 1 shows the different regions for a larger fraction of Htype receivers (α = 0.4). We can think of markets with such high α as mass markets, in
contrast to niche markets with small fractions α of H-type buyers. The comparison of the
two right panels indicates that in mass markets free contracts are not optimal for relatively
small externalities r and cost of talking ξ.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Regions in the (ξ, r)-space

3.2

Comparative Statics and Discussion

Motivated by the last observation about mass versus niche markets, here we fix ξ and analyze
the different implications for the menu of optimal contracts and reward scheme as the market
size α varies. Our model predicts a pricing pattern consistent with those that we observe in
the real world.
Proposition 2 (Market Structure and Free Contracts). Suppose G is given by (4).
(i) Consider two markets that are identical to each other except for the share of H-types,
denoted α1 and α2 . Suppose that free contracts are offered under an optimal scheme in the
market with α1 , Π∗ > 0 in the market with α2 , and α2 < α1 . Then, free contracts are offered
under any optimal scheme in the market with α2 .
(ii) Suppose vH (q) + r > cq. Then, α >

r−cq
vH (q)+r−cq

(⇔ r <

CF ∗
)
1−α

implies that free contracts

are never offered under any optimal scheme.
This proposition shows that the monopolist should encourage WoM in a market with a
small fraction α of H-type buyers as long as the market is profitable enough, i.e., Π∗∗ >
0. Intuitively, if there are many H-types, the seller is better off paying a reward because
free contracts do not increase the probability of purchase by much. The exact trade-off is
determined by the comparison of the information rent and the per-low-type surplus r − cq
18
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Regions in the (α, r)-space
that the seller can extract. The cutoff for α is increasing in this rent while decreasing in the
information rent.
Figure 2 illustrates the different regions in the (α, r)-space given the same parameters as
in Figure 1. It shows that free contracts are only optimal for small fractions α of H-buyers.
However, if there are too few H-buyers (i.e., α < 0.08 . . . ), then profits generated become
too small to make it worthwhile to encourage WoM (i.e., Π∗ = 0).16 With small externalities
r, senders have little innate benefit from WoM, so the lower bound of α above which the
profit is positive is large.
These findings are consistent with the observation that digital service providers with
small production costs who successfully offer free contracts (e.g., Dropbox or Skype), have
a large number of free users. Moreover, free contracts are combined with a reward program,
if the externalities are not large (as in Dropbox: one may use it for oneself to store files and
access them from multiple computers, or share files with others), while only free contracts
are offered if the externalities are large (as in Skype: any usage generates externalities). In
16

This region disappears with heterogeneous priors as we show in the Online Appendix.
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Externalities
Referral rewards
Free contracts
Profit

∗

r < CF
1−α
Yes
No
Positive or zero

CF ∗
1−α

<r<ξ
Yes
Yes
Positive or zero

ξ < r < ξ−CF
α
No
Yes
Positive

∗

ξ−CF ∗
α

<r<
Yes
No
Positive

ξ
α

ξ
α

<r
No
No
Positive

CF
. The use of referral rewards
Table 1: Comparative Statics with respect to r when ξ¯ < 1−α
and free contracts is conditional on the firm generating positive profits.

contrast, transportation services such as Amtrak or Uber that solely rely on referral rewards
programs would correspond to monopolists facing high α and low r, as many customers
would be willing to pay for such services and those services would not be subject to significant
externalities.17
One might think that the smaller the externalities are, the more likely rewards are used.
Figure 2 illustrates that this type of comparative statics fails for externalities. For example,
at α = 0.4, referrals are used when r = 20 but not when r = 12. The reason is that (i)
when r is high, only one of free contracts and referrals suffices to incentivize the senders, i.e.,
these two are substitutes, and (ii) the cost of offering free products CF ∗ is constant across
r’s while the optimal reward monotonically decreases with r. Thus, conditional on offering
free contracts being sufficient to encourage WoM (i.e., r ≥ ξ), offering free contracts is more
cost-saving for smaller r while rewards are more cost-saving for larger r. Table 1 summarizes
the different regions as functions of r for the case in which ξ¯ <

CF 18
.
1−α

In the following proposition, we make the claim in (i) clearer by defining what we mean
by the two strategies being “substitutes.”
Proposition 3 (Substitutes). Referrals and free contracts are strategic substitutes as long
17

Note that the fraction of the consumers purchasing free contracts is an endogenous variable, and one
might think that our association of observable fractions for these real products to the exogenous parameter α
is not justifiable. However, such association is justified because the map from consumer types to the choices
of contracts is one-to-one given that free contracts are used. That is, if a positive fraction of consumers
purchases free contracts, then within our model, such a fraction is exactly equal to 1 − α. Yet, it may
be hard to empirically test our predictions for firms that do not offer free contracts given that absent free
contracts we do not observe α.
18
If this condition is not satisfied, some regions cease existing.
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as it is optimal to have a referral program without free contracts, i.e.,

1
2
)) > R∗∗ ((q, 0), (p2H , qH
))
R∗∗ ((0, 0), (p1H , qH

(10)

1
2
1
1
for all (p1H , qH
), (p2H , qH
) ∈ R0 × R such that (i) R∗∗ ((0, 0), (p1H , qH
)) < π((0, 0), (p1H , qH
)) and
2
1
)) satisfy (2).
(ii) both menu of contracts ((0, 0), (p1H , qH
)), ((0, q), (p2H , qH

Intuitively, a sender is willing to talk only if the expected externalities from talking
are large enough. Thus, the monopolist can either directly pay the sender or increase the
likelihood of successful referrals by offering free contracts to L-type receivers. Put differently,
free contracts (paying the receiver) can be a substitute for reward payments (paying the
sender). Note that there are situations where it is too expensive to incentivize WoM with
rewards programs only (such that R∗∗ ((0, 0), (pH , qH )) = 0), but the seller might benefit from
a positive reward R in combination with free contracts. In that case, (10) is not satisfied.
In order to see the implication of the substitution result on the optimal contract and
reward scheme, Figure 3 depicts the reward under the optimal menu of contracts as a function
of parameters α and r. In Figure 3-(a), there is a discontinuous upward jump at around
α = 0.4. That is, at the point where the parameter region changes from the one where both
free contracts and referral rewards are used to the one where only a referral program is used,
the amount of the optimal reward goes up. This is precisely because of the substitution
effect: Because the free contracts are dropped, the reward has to increase. Note that the
same pattern appears in Figure 3-(b) that depicts the optimal reward as a function of the
externalities r. In that graph, there is a discontinuous downward jump at around r = 8
where the parameter region changes from the one where only a referral program is used to
the one where both free contracts and referral rewards are used.
Note that the optimal amount of reward goes down as α goes up or r goes up in the region
where only a referral program is used. This is because high α and high r means a higher
expected benefit from talking with everything else equal, so there is less need to provide
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Figure 3: Rewards under the Optimal Scheme
a large reward. On the other hand, the optimal reward is constant in α but decreasing in
r in the region where both free contracts and referral rewards are used. It is constant in
α because the receivers will be using the product (once informed) under provision of free
contracts, so the expected benefit from talking does not depend on α. It is decreasing in r
for the same reason as for the region where only a referral program is used.

4

Discussion

In this section we discuss various extensions and their implications, as well as the social
planner’s problem.

4.1

Heterogeneous WoM Cost

In Section 3, we have entirely focused on homogeneous costs of talking (i.e., G follows (4)),
in order to emphasize the core trade-off faced by a firm when encouraging senders to engage
in WoM. In the Online Appendix, we consider an extension in which different senders have
different costs of talking. With heterogeneous costs of talking, the optimal reward scheme is
more complicated as it can be used to fine-tune the amount of WoM, while with homogeneous
costs either everyone or no one talks. We analyze the optimal scheme for a fairly general
class of cost distribution G, and discuss how our results from Section 3 change. Here, we
summarize the main findings of that section.
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We show that the results from Section 3 are robust in the following sense. Free contracts
are not optimal for large α because in that case the benefit of free contracts given by (1 − α)r
is small compared to the cost CF ∗ . Referrals and free contracts remain strategic substitutes.
We also show how the homogeneous cost case can be thought of as the limit of models with
heterogeneous costs.
New insights can be derived in the heterogeneous cost model with respect to the reward
scheme. The optimal reward scheme is not constant in α when a free contact is offered (as
it is when G follows (4)), but is increasing in α. The reason is that expected profits are
higher with higher α and hence, the seller has a stronger incentive to increase WoM. If no
free contracts are offered, in addition to the aforementioned effect, there is an opposing effect
(that is present also with homogeneous costs), as the seller only needs to pay less to senders
if the expected externalities are large in order to induce the same number of senders to talk.
Thus, if no free contracts are offered the effect of α on rewards is ambiguous, where rewards
are decreasing in α if costs are sufficiently homogeneous.

4.2

Two-Sided Externalities

In the main analysis we assumed that only the senders receive externalities, and claimed
that even if we assumed the receivers would receive externalities as well, the essence of the
analysis would not change. The goal of this subsection is to make this formal. Consider
a model as in Section 2, with an additional feature that if receiver i uses the product, she
receives externalities r. In this model, for each θ ∈ {H, L}, if a type-θ receiver uses quantity
q, she experiences utility vθ (q) + r.
Note that this is a change that shifts the valuation functions by a constant, i.e., they
change from vθ (q) to vθ (q) + r for each θ = H, L. Hence, it does not alter the nature of the
optimal contract scheme under each fixed r, assuming that our restrictions are met for the
new valuation functions. This implies that all comparative statics with respect to parameters
that are not r (e.g., Proposition 2) are robust. Below we show that our main comparative
23

statics with respect to r (provided in Theorem 1) goes through as well.19
Note that Theorem 1 states that the use of free contracts is optimal if and only if the

∗ ξ−CF ∗ 
is met. Then, the use of rewards is determined by conditions
condition r ∈ CF
, α
1−α
given by the bounds independent of the size of r (the conditions are r < ξ¯ in the presence
of free contracts and r <

ξ̄
α

otherwise, and ξ¯ and

ξ̄
α

do not depend on r). It is immediate

that the same characterization goes through in our modified model, but now the size of CF ∗
depends on r. If we show that CF ∗ is nonincreasing and CF ∗ + αr is nondecreasing in
r, then the region of r such that free contracts are used is still given by a convex interval,
guaranteeing that the essence of the comparative statics does not change. We first show that
CF ∗ is strictly decreasing in r. To show this, let us write down the modified CF ∗ as follows:

CF ∗ (r) = α(vH (q(r)) + r) + (1 − α)cq(r),

where CF ∗ (r) and q(r) denote the cost of free contracts under r and the break-even quantity
for low-types under r (i.e., vL (q(r)) + r = 0), respectively. It is immediate that the second
term is strictly decreasing in r because vL0 (q) is strictly increasing in q and thus q(r) is strictly
decreasing in r. The first term is strictly decreasing in r for the following reason: Take r
0
(q) > vL0 (q) and the definition of the
and r0 with r < r0 . Then, by the assumption that vH

q(·) function, it must be the case that:


(vH (q(r0 ))+r0 )−(vH (q(r))+r) < vL (q(r0 )) − vL (q(r)) +(r0 −r) = ((−r0 ) − (−r))+(r0 −r) = 0

Overall, CF ∗ (r) is strictly decreasing in r. We next show that CF ∗ (r) + αr is strictly
increasing in r under an additional assumption about the valuation functions. Specifically,
0
suppose that 2vL0 (q) > vH
(q) +

1−α
c
α

for all q > 0. That is, the marginal values of the two

types are not too different form each other, which ensures that the information rent vH (q(r))
does not vary too much with r. Then, taking the first-order condition of CF ∗ with respect
19

We keep assuming that our restrictions are satisfied after the shifts of the valuation functions.
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1
to r and by noting q 0 (r) = − v0 (q(r))
(by the Implicit Function Theorem), one can show that
L

∗

CF (r) + αr is strictly increasing in r. All in all, free contracts are used if and only if r is
in a convex interval.
Note that this analysis provides an interesting observation that the cost of free contracts
decreases in the size of externalities because both the production cost and the information
rent decrease. The reason is that if low types receive externalities it becomes easier for the
firm to make them willing to use the product (implying low production cost) and high types
have less incentives to switch to the low-type contract at such a level of quantity provided
to low types (implying lower information rent).
To sum up, the model of two-sided externalities provides qualitatively equivalent comparative statics as our main model with one-sided externalities.

4.3

Quantity-Dependent Externalities

The main analysis is based on a model in which the magnitude of externalities is captured
by a single parameter r. As Theorem 1 shows, this is the key parameter that determines
the optimal scheme. However, one can imagine that a Dropbox user who wants to refer
his co-author receives higher positive externalities from joint usage if the co-author uses
Dropbox more. The objective of this section is to formalize the idea of quantity-dependent
externalities and discuss how such dependencies affect our predictions.
To this end, consider a function r̄ : R+ → R+ that assigns to each quantity level consumed
the value of externalities generated. We employ the normalization that r̄(0) = 0. Note that
our main model corresponds to the case in which r̄(q) = r for all q > 0. In this section we
assume that r̄ is differentiable, strictly concave, r̄0 (q) > 0 for all q ≥ 0 and limq→∞ r̄0 (q) = 0.
∗

∗
Fix an optimal scheme ((p̄∗L , q̄L∗ ), (p̄∗H , q̄H
), R ). Then, the L-type’s PC constraint and

the H-type’s IC constraint must be binding. First, consider the case when the sender’s IC
constraint is binding. In that case, (generically) positive rewards are being paid. Then, if
a contract is offered to the low types (q̄L∗ > 0), then the optimal scheme must satisfy the
25

following first-order condition:

∗
∗
0
)) = 0
) − c + r̄0 (q̄H
(q̄H
α(vH

and q ∗L ∈ {0, q} (as in the main model) if
0
(1 − α)(vL0 (qL ) − c + r̄0 (qL )) + α(vL0 (qL ) − vH
(qL )) < 0

(11)

holds for qL = q, and q ∗L satisfies the above inequality with equality otherwise.20 For simplicity, we focus the discussion on the case when the inequality in (11) is satisfied for qL = q.
Otherwise, the contract has a positive price. If low types are not served under the
optimal contract scheme, then only the first first-order condition need be satisfied. Thus, as
in the main model, there are only three possible levels of realized externalities corresponding
to the three contracts that the firm optimally chooses conditional on rewards being paid,
∗
∗
∗
≤ q̄H
holds because
r̄(q̄H
) =: rH , r̄(q) =: rL and r̄(0) = 0. Note that in this case, qH
0
∗
is decreasing.
) > 0 and vH
r̄0 (q̄H

If the sender’s IC constraint is not binding, then the sender’s IC can be ignored and thus,
∗
∗
. Let us
= qH
the optimal contract is the same as in the main model, and in particular, q̄H
∗
denote the externalities received if the high type’s contract is purchased by rh := r̄(qH
).

Here we consider how the conditions for offering free contracts change. In the absence of
free contracts, expected externalities are given by αrH , while in the presence of free contracts,
expected externalities are given by αrH + (1 − α)rL . Now, consider part 2 of Theorem 1. It
says that, for free contracts to be used in the optimal scheme, two conditions have to be met:
r(1 − α) ≥ CF ∗ and ξ − αr ≥ CF ∗ . The first inequality says that the cost of free contracts
has to be no more than the increment of the expected externalities. The second says that it
has to be no more than the rewards necessary to be paid to compensate for the difference
between the cost of talking and the externalities that are generated anyway by high types,
20

The solution exists and is unique as we assume r̄ is strictly concave and the limit of its slope is zero.
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in the absence of free contracts. Since the first inequality automatically holds when the
sender’s IC constraint does not bind, and the second inequality automatically holds when
the sender’s IC constraint binds, these conditions can be rewritten as:

rL (1 − α) ≥ CF ∗ and ξ − αrh ≥ CF ∗ .

Since CF ∗ is unchanged, these conditions imply that low externalities for low types and
high externalities for high types both reduce the set of parameters for which free contracts
are optimally offered. Thus, free contracts can be optimal only if the dependence of the magnitude of externalities does not vary too much with the quantity consumed by the receivers.
Our main analysis corresponds to the (extreme) case with constant r̄ functions, and hence
best captures the role of free contracts.

4.4

Informed Senders

To simplify the analysis, in the main analysis we assume that each sender has the same
information about the type of his receiver as the firm. However, in some markets one can
imagine that senders have better information about their friends’ willingness to pay than
the firm. The objective of this section is to consider a model that accommodates this
possibility, and to discuss robustness of and difference from the results of the main analysis.
Specifically, let us assume that each sender independently observes a signal s ∈ {sL , sH }
about his receiver. If the receiver’s type is θ = H, the sender sees a signal s = sH with

probability β ∈ 21 , 1 , and if the receiver’s type is θ = L, the sender sees a signal s = sH
with probability 1 − β.21 Thus, by Bayes rule, a sender who has received a signal sH believes
that the probability of facing a H-type receiver is αH =

αβ
(>
αβ+(1−α)(1−β)

α), while a sender

who has received a signal sL , instead believes that the probability of facing a H-type receiver
is αL =

α(1−β)
(<
α(1−β)+(1−α)β

α).

If β = 21 was the case, then senders and the firm would have exactly the same information about receivers.
Our main model corresponds to this case.
21
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How does the firm’s optimization problem change? The firm’s objective function is a
weighted sum of the profit generated by WoM of senders who have received a high signal
and the profit generated by WoM of senders who have received a low signal. The two
profit functions are as in (1) with the fraction of high valuation receivers being αH and αL ,
respectively. More precisely, a fraction αβ + (1 − α)(1 − β) of senders have received a high
signal sH and the expected profits generated by those senders is just (1) with the fraction
of H-type receivers being αH . A fraction α(1 − β) + (1 − α)β of senders has received a low
signal and the profit generated by those senders is (1) with the fraction of H-type receivers
being αL . Note that the receivers’ constraints remain unchanged. However, the firm now
faces two IC constraints for the senders - one for the senders who observed sH and one for
the senders who observed sL .
An important difference to the model we consider in the main part is that Lemma 1 is not
valid anymore as the firm can utilize the informational differences with the reward scheme.
Proposition 4 (Rewards with informed senders).

1. Suppose that all senders choose “Refer”

under the optimal scheme.
(a) If the firm does not offer free contracts, then the optimal reward scheme R satisfies
R(H) ≤ R(L) with the inequality being strict if r ∈ (0, αξL ).22
(b) If the firm offers free contracts, then the optimal reward scheme R satisfies R(H) =
R(L) = max{ξ − r, 0}.
2. Suppose that senders who received sH choose “Refer” but other senders choose “Not”
under the optimal scheme.
(a) If the firm does not offer free contracts, then there exists an optimal reward scheme
R such that R(H) > R(L) = 0. Moreover, any optimal reward scheme R satisfies
R(H) > R(L) − r.
22

R(H) = ξ − r < R(L) = ξ for ξ ≥ r and R(H) = 0 ≤ R(L) = max
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n

o

ξ−αL r
1−αL , 0

for ξ < r.

(b) If the firm offers free contracts, then there exists an optimal reward scheme R
such that R(H) > R(L) = 0. Moreover, any optimal reward scheme R satisfies
R(H) > R(L).
Each of the four cases arises given a nonempty parameter region that we compute in
the proof of Proposition 5 in the Appendix. An important implication of this proposition is
that, if the firm wants to incentivize all senders to talk, then she must pay more for referrals
of L-type receivers than for H-type receivers because L-type senders’ expected externalities
are low. In contrast, if the firm is better off excluding senders who received signal sL , then
one optimal scheme only rewards referrals of premium users. Note that if the firm wants to
induce sL -senders to talk, it should also induce sH -senders to talk because it is cheaper to
provide incentives to sH -senders and they talk to a better pool of receivers.
Solving the full problem is a daunting task because there are multiple cases to analyze
depending on which type of senders are encouraged to talk. If the monopolist decides to
encourage every sender to talk, the choice between free contracts and referral rewards can
be tricky: offering free contracts can be very attractive in a market with fraction αL of high
types but not attractive in a market with fraction αH of high types. As the firm cannot
differentiate between buyers who have generated a high signal versus a low signal, it needs
to trade off the benefits in both markets when deciding whether to offer free contracts. One
can, however, easily derive the following results for the extreme cases:
Proposition 5 (Signal strength).

∗
), then there exists β̄ < 1 such
1. If ξ − r < α(p∗H − cqH

∗
that for all β > β̄, the unique optimal menu of contracts is given by ((0, 0), (p∗H , qH
)),

and there exists an optimal reward scheme R, which satisfies R(L) = 0. If ξ − r ≥
∗
α(p∗H − cqH
), then for any β ∈ ( 21 , 1), the firm cannot make positive profits.

2. Suppose that there exists a unique optimal menu of contracts ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH )) in
n
o
∗ ξ−CF ∗
the model without signals. Then, for all r 6∈ αξ , CF
,
, there exists β̄ > 12
1−α
α
such that for all β ∈ ( 21 , β̄), there exists a unique optimal menu of contracts and it is
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((pL , qL ), (pH , qH )).
Part 1 shows that, if the signal strength β is too large, free contracts are not used by the
seller. Part 2 then shows that the model we analyze in the main section without signals is
reasonable when we think of the introduction of a new product category because in such a
case β would be close to 12 .

4.5

Effect of Advertising

In this section, we investigate how the optimal incentive scheme changes if the firm can
also engage in classic advertising. Formally, consider the situation in which the firm has
an option to conduct costly advertising before WoM takes place. The firm spends a ∈ R+
for advertising and this is observed by all senders but not by any receivers. Then, each
receiver independently becomes aware of the product prior to the communication stage with
probability p(a), where p(0) = 0 and p(a) > 0 for a > 0. The firm simultaneously chooses a
menu of contracts, a reward scheme, and advertising spending. We assume that the sender
does not observe whether the receiver is already aware of the product and only enjoys externalities if the receiver starts using the productand she engages in WoM (independently
of whether the receiver learns through advertising and/or WoM) since otherwise she cannot
know whether the receiver uses the product or not. The reward scheme is now a function
R : {L, H} × {A, N } → R+ . Here, R(θ, A) denotes the reward paid to the sender whose
receiver purchases the contract offered to θ-types and becomes aware of the product through
advertising. Similarly, R(θ, N ) denotes the reward paid to the sender whose receiver purchases the contract offered to θ-types and does not become aware of the product through
advertising.23
Having completely specified the model with advertising, let us now analyze it. Note first
that Lemma 2 again holds without any modification. Suppose now that the reward scheme R
23

We assume that the externalities r do not depend on a. Such dependence may arise if WoM is conducted
with self-enhancement motive as in Campbell et al. (2015). In such a model, r would be decreasing in a,
and advertising becomes an even less attractive option for the firm than in the current model.
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and the advertising level a is part of the optimal scheme, and all senders choose Refer under
such an optimal scheme. We assume a > 0 and derive a contradiction. To show this, consider
the following modification of the scheme. First, let R ≡ α (p(a)R(H, A) + (1 − p(a))R(H, N ))+
(1 − α) (p(a)R(L, A) + (1 − p(a))R(L, N )) be the expected reward, and construct a new reward scheme R0 such that R0 (θ, x) = R for all θ = H, L and x = A, N . As in Lemma 1, this
new scheme also satisfies the constraints and gives rise to the same expected profit, so it is
optimal too. Now, consider changing a > 0 to a new advertising level a0 = 0. With the new
scheme (R0 , a0 ), the constraints are still satisfied; in particular all the senders choose Refer.
Also, the expected profit to the monopolist increases by a > 0. This contradicts the assumption that the original scheme with (R, a) is optimal. All in all, this argument implies that
either (i) the firm chooses a positive advertising level and no WoM takes place or (ii) WoM
takes place and a = 0. Note that, in case (i), compared to the model in Section 2, advertising
either substitutes WoM or allows the firm to inform some receivers if encouragement of WoM
was too expensive.

4.6

Multiple Senders per Receiver

In the main model, we consider a stylized network structure between senders and receivers,
i.e., receiver i is connected only to sender i, and vice versa. In reality, however, it is possible
that a receiver is connected to multiple potential senders of the same information. Similarly
to the discussion in Section 4.5 where the receiver can learn from an advertisement, a receiver
has multiple sources of information if there are multiple senders. Such a situation can arise
when senders and receivers are connected through a general network structure.
In this section we discuss how the predictions change when there are multiple senders per
receiver. To make our point as clear as possible, let us assume that once a receiver adopts
a product, each sender who talked to the receiver experiences the same externalities of r.
That is, if there are m senders for a given receiver, then the total externalities generated by
the receiver are mr. The reward can be conditioned on the set of senders who talked. We
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assume that G follows (4).
Let m > 1 be the number of senders connected to a given receiver. Suppose that, when
there is only one sender, R is the optimal expected referral reward. The conclusion in Lemma
1 or the analysis in Section 4.5 entails that, by paying R in expectation to each sender, the
firm can give the same incentive of talking to the senders. However, such an adjustment
changes the firm’s total payment. This is because, the expected payment of referral reward
is no longer R, but mR.
This implies that the firm becomes reluctant to use referral rewards. More precisely, if
the optimal reward level is zero in the model with one sender per receiver, then it is still zero
in the model with multiple senders per receiver. At the same time, free contracts become
relatively more attractive as it incentivizes senders in the same way as with only one sender.
Thus, when there are multiple senders per receiver, the range of parameter values such that
only free contracts are used becomes wider because free contracts can substitute referral
rewards.

4.7

Social Optimum

In order to understand the monopolist’s strategy better, we consider the social planner’s
solution and compare it with the solution obtained in the main section. Specifically, we
consider a social planner who has control over the senders’ actions ai ∈ {Refer, Not} and
the quantities qL and qH offered to receivers, while she does not have control over receivers’
choice of whether to actually use the product after it is allocated.24 Rewards and prices do
not show up in the social planner’s problem because they are only transfers between agents.
We start with two basic observations. First, whenever WoM takes place under the monopolist’s solution, there is a surplus from WoM. Hence, it is also in the social planner’s
interest to encourage WoM. Second, under the monopolist’s optimal scheme, free contracts
24

In the classic setup of Maskin and Riley (1984), all buyers get positive utility from using the product,
and thus, they always use the product after purchase. If we were to allow the social planner to have control
0
over the use of the product and vL
(q) < c for all q > 0, then she would have low types use just a little bit
of the quantity and generate the externalities r, which we view as implausible.
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always make senders weakly better off by increasing the probability of receiving externalities,
high-type receivers better off by reducing the price due to the information rent, and low-type
receivers indifferent because their participation constraint is always binding. This implies
that, if the monopolist firm optimally offers free contracts, then it is also socially optimal to
offer it. We summarize these two observations in the following proposition:
Proposition 6.

1. If there exists a monopolist’s solution under which ai = Refer for all

i, then there exists a social planner’s solution that entails ai = Refer for all i.
∗
2. If there exists ((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH
), R) ∈ S for some R under the monopolist’s solution, then

there exists a social planner’s solution that entails qL = q.
The converse of each part of the above proposition is not necessarily true, i.e., the monopolist may be less willing to encourage WoM than the social planner or not offer free
contracts despite it being socially optimal. To see this clearly, we further investigate the
social planner’s problem in what follows.
Conditional on free contracts being offered, the welfare-maximizing menu of quantities
(qH , qL ) is exactly the same as the menu offered by the monopolist in the main section. To
see why, first note that, as in the classic screening problem in Maskin and Riley (1984), the
monopolist’s solution results in no distortions at the top, i.e., v 0 (qH ) = c. Conditional on
selling to the low types, the low-type quantity qL under the second best in Maskin and Riley
(1984) is distorted to deter high types to switch to the contract offered to low types. This
means that the social planner’s solution dictates that low types receive more quantity in the
first best than in the second best. In our problem, however, the welfare-maximizing quantity
cannot be strictly higher than q because the marginal cost c is higher than the marginal
benefit vL0 (q) for all q ≥ q (Assumption 2), and the incentive-compatible quantity cannot be
strictly lower than q because the low types would not use the product for qL < q.
Finally, whether or not the sender talks under the social planner’s solution depends on
¯ In total,
the comparison between the total benefit from talking and the cost of talking, ξ:
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Figure 4: Socially optimal WoM in the (α, r)-space: Under the social optimum, (i) the
senders engage in WoM if and only if the parameters fall in the colored parameter region,
and (ii) free contracts are used if and only if the parameters fall in the top-right region
tagged as “free contract.” The background displays the monopolist’s solution as presented
in Figure 2.
WoM is efficient if and only if

∗
∗
¯
α(vH (qH
) − cqH
+ r) + (1 − α) max{r − cq, 0} ≥ ξ.

(12)

Note that there are two social benefits of WoM. First, WoM creates network externalities
because the senders and receivers become aware of each other using the product. Second,
it creates gains from trade because some high-valuation buyers learn about the product.
Figure 4 summarizes the above findings using the same parameters as in Figure 2.
In the monopolist’s solution, free contracts are not used if r <
definition of CF ∗ , shows that this is equivalent to r−cq <

α
v (q).
1−α H

CF ∗
.
1−α

Substituting the

Since the social planner

uses free contracts if 0 < r − cq, the monopolist uses free contracts too little from the social
planner’s point of view conditional on it being socially optimal to encourage WoM if r is
high, and α or vH (q) is high. The reason is as follows. On the one hand, high externalities
r imply a high additional benefit r from having a receiver using the product, so that the
social planner wants all receivers to use the product. However, such r pertains to the senders
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and the monopolist cannot extract the entire corresponding surplus. On the other hand, the
monopolist is reluctant to use free contracts if the information rent necessary to induce high
types to purchase a premium contracts is high relative to the number of low types who choose
the free contracts. The “per low-type” information rent

α
v (q)
1−α H

is high if α or vH (q) is

high.

5

Conclusion

The case of Dropbox shows that WoM plays an important role in customer acquisition. This
paper is the first to incorporate WoM in a contracting problem. We jointly analyzed the
role of a freemium strategy and referral rewards when incentivizing WoM for products with
positive externalities.
We present a model of optimal contracting in which the number of customers depends
on WoM. The monopolist firm optimally encourages senders of the information to engage
in WoM by fine-tuning two parts of the benefit of talking: referral rewards and expected
externalities.
Despite being very simple, the model allows for a rich set of predictions. Depending on
the environment, it is optimal to use one, both or none of these methods. We show that it
is optimal to use referral programs when the size of externalities is small, and free versions
are useful when there are many low-type customers. The pattern of the optimal scheme is
consistent with the strategies we observe for companies such as Dropbox, Skype, Uber, and
Amtrak.
We keep our model particularly simple and there are many ways to enrich it. We have
enumerated potential reasons for the use of free products in the Related Literature, and it
would be interesting to build a model that includes those effects as well. In such extensions,
the findings in this paper would be helpful in identifying the implication of the those additional effects. One feature of our model that may be unrealistic is that low-type receivers
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enjoy zero surplus. Such a feature would disappear once we have more than two types (such
as a continuous type model). Even in such a model, the basic feature of the optimal scheme
would be the same; for example, under certain parameter values free contracts would be
purchased with positive probability as long as there are some types whose valuations are
lower than the cost of production.
Another extension of interest is the one in which receivers are uncertain about the quality
of the product, and the senders have higher incentives to talk when the he knows the quality
is higher. In such a model, if the receivers know that the senders would receive referral
rewards, then they may adjust their belief about the quality downwards. Although this may
be a worthwhile direction to extend the model, it would require too much divergence from
the Maskin-Riley model, and hence is outside the scope of the current paper.
Finally, our work suggests possibilities of empirical research. It may help estimate the
value of externalities that the senders perceive upon referring. We hope our paper stimulates
a sequence of such research.
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A

Appendix: Proofs

Proof. (Proposition 1) First, we show that it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to choice variables in a compact set. To see this, first note that, as we will show
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in the proof of Lemma 2, a scheme ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH ), R) with qL ∈ (0, q) generates a
strictly lower profit than a scheme ((pL , 0), (pH , qH ), R). The same proof also shows that
a scheme ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH ), R) with qL > q generates a strictly lower profit than a scheme
((pL , q), (pH , qH ), R). Thus it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to {0, q} as
the space from which qL is chosen. This and the the participation constraint for low types
implies that if a scheme ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH ), R) satisfies the constraints then pL ≤ 0. Also, the
proof for Lemma 2 shows that for any scheme ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH ), R), pL < 0 implies that the
participation constraints for both types are non-binding, hence there exists  > 0 such that
there exists a scheme ((pL + , qL ), (pH + , qH ), R) that satisfies the constraints and generates
a higher profit than the original scheme. Consequently, it is without loss of generality to
restrict attention to a scheme ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH ), R) with pL = 0.
0
(q) < c, there exists q 0 such that any scheme ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH ), R)
Also, since limq→∞ vH

with qH > q 0 generates a strictly negative profit. Thus it is without loss of generality to
0
restrict attention to [0, q 0 ] for the space for qH , where q 0 is any number satisfying vH
(q 0 ) < c.

Fix such q 0 < ∞ arbitrarily. Then, any scheme ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH ), R) with R > vH (q 0 )
generates a strictly negative profit, so again it is without loss to restrict attention to [0, vH (q 0 )]
as the space for R.
These bounds for qH and qL together with the PC constraints imply that it is without
loss of generality to consider pH ≤ vH (q 0 ). The incentive compatibility condition for low
types implies that 0 = max{vL (qL ), 0} − pL ≥ max{vL (qH ), 0} − pH , which implies pH ≥
max{vL (qH ), 0} ≥ 0. Thus, it is without loss of generality to consider pH ∈ [0, vH (q 0 )].
These facts and the fact that all constraints are weak inequalities with continuous functions imply that the optimal scheme is chosen from a compact set. Now, note that the
objective function is right-continuous in each choice variable because G is a cumulative
distribution function, and all jumps are upwards.
These facts and the assumption that G has only finitely many discontinuities imply that
there exists a partition of the compact space of the choice variables C with a finite number
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of cells (P1 , . . . , PK ) for some integer K ∈ N, such that over each cell, the objective function
is continuous.
Let π̂ be the supremum of the objective function over C. Then there exists a sequence
(y k )k=1,2,... with y k ∈ C for all k such that the value of the objective function under y k
converges to π̂. Since K < ∞, this implies that there exists a cell of the partition, denoted
Pi∗ (choose one arbitrarily if there are multiples of such cells), and a subsequence (z k )k=1,2,...
of (y k )k=1,2,... such that z k ∈ Pi∗ for all k.
Since Pi∗ is a bounded set, (z k )k=1,2,... has an accumulation point. Let an arbitrary choice
of an accumulation point be z ∗ . If z ∗ ∈ Pi∗ , then by continuity the objective function
attains the value π̂ at z ∗ . If z ∗ 6∈ Pi∗ , then by the assumption of the upward jumps, the
objective function attains the value strictly greater than π̂ at z ∗ , which is a contradiction.
This completes the proof.
Proof. (Lemma 2) Let ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH ), R) be an optimal scheme.
(i) Given a menu of contracts with qL > q that satisfy (2), continuity of vL implies
that the monopolist can decrease qL and pL slightly, such that max{vL (qL ), 0} − pL remains
constant (by Assumption 1) without violating (2) because vH (qL ) − pL decreases with such
0
a change (as vH
> vL0 ). This strictly increases profits by Assumption 2. Similarly, given a

menu of contracts with 0 < qL < q that satisfy (2) and such that Π∗ > 0, the monopolist
can decrease qL to zero and increase profits without violating (2).
The equation pL = 0 can be shown by noting that type L’s participation constraint must
be binding: Assume pL < max{vL (qL ), 0} = 0. First, note that then type H’s participation
constraint cannot be binding: If it was, then

0 = max{vH (qH ), 0} − pH ≥ max{vH (qL ), 0} − pL ≥ max{vL (qL ), 0} − pL > 0

which is a contradiction. Thus, the monopolist can strictly increase profits by increasing
pL and pH by the same small amount such that (2) remains to be satisfied. Consequently,
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pL = max{vL (qL ), 0} = 0.
(ii) Given a R, pL = 0 and fixing qL ∈ {0, q}, H-type’s contract (pH , qH ) must solve
maxpH ,qH α(pH −qH c) subject to max{vH (qH ), 0}−pH ≥ max{vH (qL ), 0} and max{vH (qH ), 0}−
pH ≥ 0. If we ignored the participation constraint, and solved a relaxed problem, the in∗
centive compatibility constraint must be binding and it follows that qH = qH
and pH =
∗
max{vH (qH
), 0} − max{vH (qL ), 0}. This automatically satisfies the participation constraint:

∗
∗
max{vH (qH
), 0} − [max{vH (qH
), 0} − max{vH (qL ), 0}] = max{vH (qL ), 0} > max{vL (qL ), 0} = 0.

The above proof shows that IC constraint of the H-type is binding. Using this fact, parts
(iii) and (iv) follow by plugging qL into type-H’s incentive compatibility constraint.
Proof. (Lemma 3, Referral Program) A sender talks if and only if


ξ ≤ r α + (1 − α) · 1{qL >0,vL (qL )≥0} + R.

As a result, the monopolist must pay at least (5) in order to assure that senders talk and
thus, the monopolist pays exactly this as long as it is profitable to inform receivers, i.e., as
long as R∗∗ ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH )) < π((pL , qL ), (pH , qH )) holds.
Proof. (Lemma 4, Free Contracts) (i) If ξ ≤ αr, then the senders’ IC constraint is always
satisfied, so that the seller’s problem collapses to

max

pL ,pH ∈R, qL ,qH ≥0



N · α · (pH − qH · c) + (1 − α) · (pL − qL · c) − R

which is equivalent to the maximization problem in the benchmark case with free WoM.
Thus, no free contracts are offered under any optimal scheme.
(ii) First, note that if Π∗ > 0, it suffices to show when profits with free contracts (and the
optimal reward scheme given by Lemma 3) are greater than profits without free contracts.
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Let αr < ξ ≤ r. First, if ξ − αr > Πclassic , then by Lemma 3 not offering free contracts
yields negative profits and cannot be optimal. If ξ − αr ≤ Πclassic , then by Lemma 3, the
optimal reward is R = 0 whenever qL = q and is R = ξ − αr whenever qL = 0. With pL = 0
and (pH , qH ) as in Lemma 2, it follows immediately that offering free contracts generates
weakly higher profits than offering qL = 0 if and only if Πclassic − αvH (q) − (1 − α) · q · c ≥
Πclassic − (ξ − αr), which is equivalent to (8).
(iii) Let ξ > r. Then, by Lemma 3 if the monopolist chooses qL = q, then profits are given
by Πclassic − CF ∗ − (ξ − r) and if qL = 0, then profits are given by Πclassic − (ξ − αr). Thus,
offering free contracts generates a weakly higher profit than offering no free contracts if and
only if Πclassic − CF ∗ − (ξ − r) ≥ Πclassic − (ξ − αr), which is equivalent to CF ∗ ≤ (1 − α)r.
Proof. (Theorem 1, Full Characterization) 1. By Lemmas 2 and 3, Π∗ > 0 if and only
if Πclassic − CF ∗ − max{ξ − r, 0} > 0 or Πclassic − max{ξ − αr, 0} > 0. Since Πclassic > 0, this
can be rewritten as Πclassic − CF ∗ − max{ξ − r, 0} > 0 or Πclassic − (ξ − αr) > 0.
2. This follows immediately from Lemma 4.
3. (a) By Lemma 3, in the presence of free contracts, a reward must only be paid if r > ξ.
(b) Similarly, if no free contracts are offered, positive rewards are only being paid if αr <
ξ.
Proof. (Proposition 2) (i) Denote the maximal expected profit without free contracts (i.e.,
qL = 0 is offered to low types) under α by Πnot free (α). Similarly, denote the maximal expected
profit with free contracts under α by Πfree (α).25 The function Πnot free (α) is concave as long
as Πnot free (α) > 0, and Πfree (α) is linear in α as long as Πfree (α) > 0. Moreover, we have
that

∗
lim Πfree (α) = lim α(p∗H − qH
c − vH (q)) − (1 − α)qc − max{ξ − r, 0}

α→1

α→1

∗
< lim α(p∗H − qH
c) − max{ξ − αr, 0} = Πnot free (α).
α→1

25

Existence of these maxima follows from an analogous proof to the one for Proposition 1.
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This implies that Πnot free (α) and Πfree (α) intersect at most once. Hence, if Πfree (α1 ) ≥
Πnot free (α1 ), then Πfree (α2 ) > Πnot free (α2 ) for all α2 < α1 . This concludes the proof.
(ii) This part follows directly from part 2 of Theorem 1.
Proof. (Proposition 3) By Lemma 3, we have

1
2
R∗∗ ((0, 0), (p1H , qH
)) = max{ξ − αr, 0} > max{ξ − r, 0} ≥ R∗∗ ((0, q), (p2H , qH
))

1
1
because R∗∗ ((0, 0), (p1H , qH
)) < π((0, 0), (p1H , qH
)) and ξ − αr > 0.

Proof. (Proposition 4) 1. If all senders choose Refer, the IC constraints for all senders—
those who see sH and those who see sL — must be satisfied. (a) Without free contracts, the
senders’ IC constraints are given by:

ξ ≤ αH r + (αH R(H) + (1 − αH )R(L))

and

ξ ≤ αL r + (αL R(H) + (1 − αL )R(L)).

The optimal reward conditional on these constraints minimizes referral reward payments by
making both senders’ IC constraints binding whenever possible. The firm is able to do this
if and only if r ≤ ξ and in that case the optimal reward scheme is given by R(H) = ξ − r
n
o
Lr
,
0
.
and R(L) = ξ. If r > ξ, it is optimal to set R(H) = 0 and R(L) = max ξ−α
1−αL
(b) With free contracts, the senders’ IC constraints are given by:

ξ ≤ r + (αH R(H) + (1 − αH )R(L))

and

ξ ≤ r + (αL R(H) + (1 − αL )R(L)).

Thus, it is optimal to set R(H) = R(L) = max{ξ − r, 0}.
2. If senders who saw sL do not talk, then only the IC constraint of a sender who sees
sH must be satisfied and the IC constraint of the sender who sees sL must be violated.
(a) Without free contracts, the firm minimizes reward payments subject to these constraints by minimizing αH R(H) + (1 − αH )R(L) (i.e., making the IC for the sender with sH
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binding whenever possible) such that

αL r + (αL R(H) + (1 − αL )R(L)) < ξ ≤ αH r + (αH R(H) + (1 − αH )R(L)).

First, note that these inequalities imply R(H) > R(L) − r. Second, if a referral scheme with
R(H), R(L) ≥ 0 that satisfies these inequalities exists (this is the case whenever

ξ
αL

− r ≥ 0),

then the referral scheme given by R(L) = 0, R(H) = max{ αξH − r, 0} must maximize the
seller’s profits: The seller cannot increase profits by decreasing αH R(H) + (1 − αH )R(L).
(b) With free contracts, the constraints become

r + (αL R(H) + (1 − αL )R(L)) < ξ ≤ r + (αH R(H) + (1 − αH )R(L)),

which imply R(H) > R(L). By an analogous argument as in (a), a reward scheme satisfying
these constraints exists if and only if ξ − r ≥ 0 and in that case the scheme given by
R(H) =

ξ−r
,
αH

R(L) = 0 maximizes profits.

Proof. (Proposition 5) 1. First, note that any optimal scheme results in one of the following
three types of behaviors by the senders: Either (i) no senders talks, or (ii) all senders talk,
or (iii) only senders who have received a sH signal talk.26
∗
If ξ − r ≥ α(p∗H − cqH
), then for all β ∈ ( 12 , 1) the firm cannot make positive profits. We
∗
). We will show that for sufficiently large β, the
assume from now on ξ − r < α(p∗H − cqH

firm can make positive profits, i.e., that we are in case (ii) or (iii).
Fix β ∈ ( 12 , 1). If ξ − rαL ≤ 0, then all senders talk even without any reward payments
as long as H-type receivers consume a positive quantity. Thus, we are in case (ii), and so
for any optimal scheme ((pH , qH ), (pL , qL ), R), R(L) = 0 and qL = 0 hold.
∗
We assume from now on that rαL < ξ < α(p∗H − cqH
) + r. Under a reward scheme R
26

Note that there is no optimal scheme in which sL -senders talk while sH -senders do not talk. This is
because αH > αL and thus, given a scheme ((pH , qH ), (pL , qL ), R) where only sL -senders talk, the seller can
strictly increase profits by choosing a reward scheme R0 with R0 (H) = R0 (L) = αL R(H) + (1 − αL )R(L)
while holding the menu of contracts fixed. Under this scheme, both sender types talk.
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with R(L) = 0 (as specified in Proposition 4) and R(H) =

max{ξ−αH r,0}
,
αH

the senders who

have seen sH talk, while senders who have seen sL do not talk.
Next we show that, there exists β̄ < 1 such that for all β > β̄, it is not optimal to offer
free contracts and the firm always chooses to be in case (iii). For this purpose, we compute
the profits from cases (ii) and (iii).
• Case (iii): Since αH → 1 as β → 1, there exists β̄ < 1 such that for all β > β̄, it is not
optimal to offer free contracts by the analysis in Section 3. Thus, the profits are given
∗
by αβ(p∗H − cqH
) − (αβ + (1 − α)(1 − β)) max{ξ − αH r, 0}, which is greater than zero
∗

∗
) − α max{ξ − r, 0} ≥
for sufficiently large β because it converges to ΠH ≡ α(p∗H − cqH
∗
∗
)} > 0 as β → 1.
max{α(p∗H − cqH
) − (ξ − r), α(p∗H − cqH

• Case (ii): We consider two cases: ξ ≥ r and ξ < r.
∗
– ξ ≥ r: By Proposition 4, without free contracts, profits are given by α(p∗H −cqH
)−
∗
(ξ − αr) and with free contracts they are given by α(p∗H − cqH
) − CF ∗ − (ξ − r).
∗

Both profits are strictly smaller than ΠH .
∗
– ξ < r: Without free contracts, profits are given by α(p∗H −cqH
)−(1−α) max

n

∗
) − CF ∗ . Both profits converge to
and with free contracts, they are α(p∗H − cqH
∗

numbers that are smaller than ΠH as β → 1.
Hence, there exists β̄ < 1 such that for all β > β̄, it is not optimal to offer free contracts
and the firm always chooses to be in case (iii). This concludes the proof.
2. If β = 21 , then one can immediately see from the expressions above that profits coincide
with the ones in the main section. Thus, by continuity, for any r < αξ̄ , there exists a β̄ > 12


CF ∗
such that for all β ∈ ( 21 , β̄), r < αξ̄L and r < αξ̄H . Similarly, for any r ∈ αξ̄L , 1−α
, there
L




CF ∗
CF ∗
exists a β̄ > 12 such that for all β ∈ ( 12 , β̄), r ∈ αξ̄L , 1−α
and r ∈ αξ̄H , 1−α
. Analogous
L
H
 ∗



∗
∗
conclusions hold for intervals CF
, ξ−CF
and ξ−CF
, ∞ . Thus, there exists a β̄ > 12
1−α
α
α
such that for all β ∈ ( 21 , β̄), the same analysis as in the main section applies for β.
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July 12, 2016

B

Heterogeneous Costs of WoM

In this Online Appendix, we consider the case with heterogeneous costs of talking. We
restrict attention to twice differentiable G with G0 = g satisfying g(ξ) > 0 for all ξ ∈ R+ and
Assumption 4. G is strictly log-concave, i.e.,

g
G

is strictly decreasing.

This condition is satisfied by a wide range of distributions such as exponential distributions, a class of gamma, Weibull, and chi-square distributions, among others.
Section B.1 characterizes the optimal scheme. Section B.2 conducts comparative statics
of the optimal scheme. Section B.3 contains all the proofs for these results. Section B.4
discusses how the main model with homogeneous costs can be viewed as a limit of models
with heterogeneous costs.

B.1

Properties of Optimal Contracts

First, we characterize the optimal reward. If free contracts are offered, it acts as a substitute
for reward payments, which results in higher optimal rewards absent free contracts. The
following proposition provides conditions under which a positive reward is optimally offered.
Lemma 5 (Optimal Reward). In the model with heterogeneous costs, there exists rfree and
rnot free with rnot free > rfree such that the following are true:
*

Kamada: Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720, e-mail:
y.cam.24@gmail.com; Öry: School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511, e-mail:
aniko.oery@yale.edu.
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1. If r < rfree , then ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH ), R) ∈ S implies R > 0.
2. If rfree ≤ r < rnot free , then ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH ), R) ∈ S implies either R > 0 and qL = 0,
or R = 0 and qL = q.
3. If rnot free ≤ r, then ((pL , qL ), (pH , qH ), R) ∈ S implies R = 0.
In order to prove this, we fix a menu of contracts with and without free contracts satisfying
the conditions in Lemma 2 and solve for the optimal reward scheme. That is, conditional
on offering free contracts (qL = q), we define the maximal profit under (r, α) by
Πfree (r, α) = max
R≥0





∗
π((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH
)) − R · G(r + R)

and conditional on offering no free contracts (qL = 0), define the maximal profit under (r, α)
by

∗
Πnot free (r, α) = max ([π((0, 0), (p∗H , qH
)) − R] · G(αr + R)) .
R≥0

Let us also define the unique optimal reward given that free contracts are offered and that
no free contracts are offered by Rfree (r, α) and Rnot free (r, α), respectively.
There are three reasons why rnot free > rfree holds. As opposed to a situation without free
contracts, with free contracts, (i) positive quantity is offered to low types, (ii) information
rent is provided to high types, and (iii) the sender receives full externalities conditional
on talking. All these effects reduce the incentive to provide referral rewards. Note that
rnot free corresponds to

ξ
α

in the homogeneous model, while rfree corresponds to ξ. In the

homogeneous-cost setting, only reason (iii) affected the comparison of rfree and rnot free . The
effects (i) and (ii) were present, but they only determined whether offering free contracts
generates nonnegative profits.
The following theorem summarizes some general properties of optimal contracts. Unlike
Theorem 1, it is not a full characterization, but it shows that many features of the optimal
2

scheme with homogeneous cost carries over to the ones for heterogeneous costs.
Theorem 2 (Optimal Contracts). The following claims hold in the model with heterogeneous
costs:
1. (Positive profits) Πnot free (r, α) > 0 for all r ∈ [0, ∞) and α ∈ (0, 1).
∗
2. (Using both rewards and free contracts) There exists ((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH
), R) ∈ S

such that R > 0 (i.e., it is optimal to provide both free contracts and rewards) if and
only if

r

3. Suppose that

G(ξ)
g(ξ)

free

CF ∗
.
>r≥
1−α

(13)

is convex.
∗

(a) (Free vs. no free contracts) There exist r, r ∈ [ CF
, ∞) such that there ex1−α
∗
), R) ∈ S for some R ≥ 0 (i.e., it is optimal to provide free
ists ((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH

contracts) if and only if r ∈ [r, r].
(b) (Never free contracts) If

CF ∗
1−α

> rnot free , then [r, r] = ∅.

First, unlike in the homogeneous-cost model, profits without offering free contracts are
always positive: With homogeneous costs, profits without free contracts are negative when
the share of high types are low, so the expected externalities are low. This is because low
expected externalities imply that a sufficient size of reward is necessary to encourage WoM,
but such a cost cannot be compensated by the profits generated by only a small fraction of
high types. With heterogenous costs, there always exists some fraction of customers with
sufficiently small WoM costs, who do not need to be rewarded to initiate referrals.
Part 2 of the proposition shows that even with heterogeneous costs we can derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a combination of free contracts and rewards programs to
be offered. As with homogeneous cost, free contracts are only optimal for sufficiently large
externalities r and rewards are only offered for sufficiently small externalities.
3

Externalities
Referral rewards
Free contracts

r < rfree
Yes
∗
No ⇔ r < CF
1−α

rfree < r < rnot free
No
Yes
or
Yes
No

rnot free < r
No
Yes ⇔ r is small

Table 2: Comparative Statics with respect to r with heterogeneous WoM costs
For a full characterization of the optimal menu of contracts, it is useful to impose the
additional assumption that

G
g

is convex. This condition is, for example, satisfied by the

exponential distribution. Given this assumption, free contracts are only offered for an intermediate connected range of externalities r. We can extend these results qualitatively as
follows.
Remark 1. If we do not impose

G
g

to be convex, one can still show that limr→0 Πnot free (r, α) >

limr→0 Πfree (r, α) and limr→∞ Πnot free (r, α) > limr→∞ Πfree (r, α), i.e., free contracts can only
be optimal if r is not too large and not too small.
Remark 2. With homogeneous cost ξ¯ > 0, r, rfree , r and rnot free correspond to

CF ∗
,
1−α

¯
ξ,

ξ−CF ∗
,
α

and αξ̄ , respectively. In Appendix B.4, we formalize this correspondence by considering a limit
of models with heterogeneous costs converging to the one with the homogeneous cost.
Table 2 summarizes the results of Lemma 5 and Theorem 2 for the case when

G(ξ)
g(ξ)

is

convex.

B.2

Comparative Statics

Deriving precise comparative statics in the heterogeneous setup is daunting. While it is
straightforward to show that Πnot free (r, α) and Πfree (r, α) are increasing in the size of externalities (r) and the fraction of the high types (α), it is hard to pin down how the comparison
between these two values are affected as we change parameters (r and α). Nevertheless,
using the partial characterization of the optimal contracts we can make comparative statics
to understand robustness and changes of our results with the introduction of heterogeneity
of WoM costs.
4

Proposition 7 (Market Structure and Free Contracts). The following claims hold in the
model with heterogeneous costs for any fixed r ∈ [0, ∞). limα→0 Πnot free (r, α) > limα→0 Πfree (r, α)
and limα→1 Πnot free (r, α) > limα→1 Πfree (r, α).28
The intuition for Proposition 7 is as follows. The only reason to offer free contracts is
to boost up the expected externalities by (1 − α)r, and such boosting is not significant if α
is high, hence offering free contracts is suboptimal in those cases. With homogeneous costs,
we showed in Section 3 that free contracts are optimal only when α is small. Similarly, with
heterogeneous costs, a free contract cannot be optimal for high α. Moreover, if α is too
small, Πfree (r, α) < 0 holds because there are too few high types to compensate for the high
cost of free contracts, and Πnot free (r, α) > 0 holds because a strictly positive share of senders
with very small WoM cost talk by part 1 of Theorem 2. This effect was not present with
homogeneous costs, where the seller does not incentivize WoM at all, resulting in Π∗ = 0.
The previous arguments imply that if there exists a set of parameters such that free
contracts are optimal, then the choice of free versus non-free contracts is non-monotonic
with respect to both r and α.
The comparative statics of the optimal reward scheme is more intricate with heterogeneous costs of WoM as the sender can fine-tune the number of senders that she wants to
incentivize to engage in WoM.
Proposition 8 (Optimal Reward Scheme). Let r < rfree . Then, the following hold in the
model with heterogeneous costs:
(i) Rfree (r, α) is increasing in α. Rnot free (r, α) is increasing in α if and only if αrĜ0 (αr +
Rnot free (r, α)) < Πclassic , where we define Ĝ(ξ) ≡

G(ξ)
g(ξ)

for all ξ ∈ R+ .

(ii) Rfree (r, α) and Rnot free (r, α) are decreasing in r.
(iii) Referrals and free contracts are strategic substitutes, i.e. Rfree (r, α) < Rnot free (r, α) for
all r ∈ (0, rnot free ) and α ∈ (0, 1).
28

These limits exist because of the monotonicity in α.
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Although part (ii) has the same prediction as in the case with homogeneous WoM costs,
the prediction in part (i) is different. We first explain the comparative statics regarding
Rfree (r, α). Under homogeneous costs, every sender talks and every receiver buys anyway
under the usage of free contracts, so α does not affect the optimal reward level. With
heterogeneous costs, however, the firm needs to tradeoff the gain and loss of increasing the
rewards. The gain is the additional receivers who hear from the senders who start talking due
to the increase of the rewards. The loss is the additional payments. The gain is increasing
in α, so the firm has more incentive to raise the rewards.
The relationship of the optimal reward and α conditional on no free contracts being
offered is ambiguous because two forces are present. First, higher α means more benefit from
the receivers, and this contributes to the incentive to raise the rewards. On the other hand,
higher α means more expected externalities, so there is less need to bribe a given sender. This
contributes to lowering the rewards. Naturally, the second effect dominates when senders
are relatively homogeneous, and indeed the optimal reward is strictly decreasing when G is
completely homogeneous as in the main analysis. To formalize this idea, define
 0
G
(x)
HM G ≡ sup
g
x
which can be interpreted as a measure of homogeneity of costs. If HM G is large, it means
that there is a small range of costs of WoM that are held by many senders and HM G
goes to infinity in the limit as G converges to the completely homogeneous one in (4). An
implication of the condition in part (i) of Proposition 8 is that there exists HM G > 0 such
that if HM G < HM G, then Rnot free (r, α) is increasing in α.
∗

Recall that both free contracts and positive rewards are used if and only if r ∈ [ CF
, rfree ).
1−α
Proposition 9 (Market Structure and Using Both Rewards and Free Contracts). The following claims hold in the model with heterogeneous costs:
1.

CF ∗
1−α

and rfree are strictly increasing in α.
6

2.

CF ∗
1−α

is strictly increasing and rfree is strictly decreasing in c.

As in the homogeneous-cost model, free contracts can only be optimal if the size of
externalities r is larger than

CF ∗
.
1−α

Since this number is increasing in α, free contracts are

optimal for small r in niche markets with small α. Thus, free contracts and referral rewards
should be jointly used in niche markets (small α) if externalities are rather small, while they
should be used in mass (larger α) markets if externalities are comparably larger.
With homogeneous costs, all receivers use the product under free contracts. Thus, what
¯ does not vary with α or c. With heterogenous costs, however,
corresponds to rfree (which is ξ)
it varies with these parameters. This is because the increase in α or decrease in c contributes
to an increase of the expected profit per receiver, which increases the firm’s incentive to offer
referral rewards.

B.3

Proofs

Proof. (Lemma 5) First, we show the existence of unique cutoffs rfree and rnot free . The
first-order condition of Πfree (r, α) with respect to R is that (i) R = 0 or (ii) R > 0 and


G(r + R)
∗
∗
= 0.
g(r + R) · π((0, q), (p̃H , qH )) − R −
g(r + R)
Note that the expression in the bracket on the left-hand side is strictly decreasing given
Assumption 4 and vary continuously from ∞ to −∞ as R varies from −∞ to ∞. Hence,
the optimal reward is always unique in R. Also, the same argument implies that there exists
∗
a unique r such that π((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH
)) −

G(r)
g(r)

= 0. Let this unique r be rfree . That is, the

left-hand side of the first-order condition is nonpositive and thus Rfree (r, α) = 0 if and only
if r ≥ rfree .
Analogously, conditional on offering no free contracts (qL = 0), the optimal reward is
∗
unique in R and there exists a unique r such that π((0, 0), (p∗H , qH
)) − G(αr)
= 0. We denote
g(αr)

this r by rnot free . As before, we have that Rnot free (r, α) = 0 if and only if r ≥ rnot free .
7

Finally, we show that rfree < rnot free . To see this, note that Assumption 4 implies
G(αr)
αr

<

G(r)
r

∗
∗
for r > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1). Together with π((0, 0), (p∗H , qH
)) > π((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH
)) ,

rfree < αrnot free follows by Assumption 4 and the definitions of rfree and rnot free . Since α < 1,
this implies rfree < rnot free .
Proof. (Theorem 2)
∗
1. By Assumption 3, π((0, 0), (p∗H , qH
)) > 0 holds. Also, since g(ξ) > 0 for all ξ ∈ R+ ,
∗
G(ξ) > 0 for all ξ > 0. Hence, for any r ∈ [0, ∞) and α ∈ (0, 1), [π((0, 0), (p∗H , qH
)) −
∗
R] · G(αr + R) > 0 holds if R ∈ (0, π((0, 0), (p∗H , qH
))). Thus, Πnot free (r, α) > 0.

2. Note that the use of both, free contracts and positive rewards, is optimal only if
r < rfree . Also, r < rfree implies that rewards are positive. Furthermore, in that
case the maximization problems defining Πfree (r, α) and Πnot free (r, α) both have inner
solutions, so the two maximization problems can be rewritten as:
Πfree (r, α) = maxx∈R (Afree − x) · G(x)

(14)

Πnot free (r, α) = maxx∈R (Anot free − x) · G(x)
∗
∗
)) + αr. Thus,
)) + r and Anot free = π((0, 0), (p∗H , qH
where Afree = π((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH

Πfree (r, α) ≥ Πnot free (r, α) if and only if

∗
∗
π((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH
)) + r ≥ π((0, 0), (p∗H , qH
)) + αr.

This is equivalent to r ≥

CF ∗
.
1−α

Also, by part 1 of the current theorem, Πfree (r, α) ≥

Πnot free (r, α) implies Πfree (r, α) > 0. Overall, there exists an optimal scheme such that
∗

both free contracts and positive rewards are used if and only if r ∈ [ CF
, rfree ).
1−α
3. Consider a variable
Πfree (r, α)
.
Πnot free (r, α)
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(15)

This variable is well-defined because the denominator is always strictly positive by part
1 of the current theorem.
Step 1: Note that for r ≥ rnot free , Lemma 5 shows that the rewards are zero in any op∗
∗
timal scheme. Hence, Πfree = π((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH
))·G(r) and Πnot free = π((0, 0), (p∗H , qH
))·

G(αr) hold, and thus (15) is differentiable with respect to r. If
∗ )) · G(r)
∂ Πfree (r, α)
∂ π((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH
=
∗ )) · G(αr)
∂r Πnot free (r, α)
∂r π((0, 0), (p∗H , qH


G(r)
G(αr)
∗
∗
g(αr) − α g(r) · π((0, q), (p̃H , qH )) · g(r) · g(αr)
∗ ))] · G(αr)2
[π((0, 0), (p∗H , qH

G
g

is convex, then

=

< 0.

Thus, when r ≥ rnot free , either (i) free contracts are not optimal for any r ∈
[rnot free , ∞), or (ii) there exists a r0 ≥ rnot free such that there exists an optimal scheme
in which free contracts are offered for r ∈ [rnot free , r0 ], and no free contracts are offered
under any optimal scheme for r > r0 . It must be the case that r0 < ∞ because
∗
∗
π((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH
)) · G(r)
))
π((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH
=
< 1.
∗
∗
∗
∗
r→∞ π((0, 0), (p , q )) · G(αr)
π((0, 0), (pH , qH ))
H H

lim

We let r̄ = r̄0 in case (ii).
Step 2: Next, we consider the following three different cases:
[rfree , rnot free ], and
• Let

CF ∗
1−α

CF ∗
1−α

CF ∗
1−α

< rfree ,

CF ∗
1−α

∈

> rnot free .

< rfree . Then, it follows from part 2 of the current theorem that no free

contracts are offered for r <

CF ∗
1−α

∗

and free contracts are offered for r ∈ [ CF
, rfree ].
1−α

For r ∈ [rfree , rnot free ],
∗ ))] · G(r)
[π((0, q), (p∗H , qH
∂ Πfree (r, α)
∂
=
∗ )) − R] · G(αr + R) =
∂r Πnot free (r, α)
∂r maxR∈R [π((0, 0), (p∗H , qH


G(αr+Rnot free (r,α))
∗
∗
not free (r, α))
− α G(r)
g(r) · π((0, q), (pH , qH )) · g(r) · g(αr + R
g(αr+Rnot free (r,α))
.
∗ )) − Rnot free (r, α)] · G(αr + Rnot free (r, α))2
[π((0, 0), (p∗H , qH

Note that Πnot free (r, α) is differentiable in r by the Envelope Theorem. Moreover,
9

if

G(αr+R)
g(αr+R)

− α G(r)
< 0, then αr + R < r because
g(r)

G(ξ)
g(ξ)

is increasing in ξ by As-

sumption 4. Moreover, Rnot free (r, α) is differentiable in r by the implicit function
theorem applied to the first-order condition of Πnot free and, letting Ĝ(ξ) :=

G(ξ)
g(ξ)

for all ξ,
αĜ0 (αr + Rnot free (r, α))
∂ not free
< 0.
R
(r, α) = −
∂r
1 + Ĝ0 (αr + Rnot free (r, α))
Thus,

G(r)
G(αr + Rnot free (r, α))
−α
=
g(αr + Rnot free (r, α))
g(r)


∂
α Ĝ0 (αr + Rnot free (r, α)) − Ĝ0 (r) + Ĝ0 (αr + Rnot free (r, α)) Rnot free (r, α) =
∂r
!
0
not free 2
Ĝ
(αr
+
R
)
α Ĝ0 (αr + Rnot free (r, α)) − Ĝ0 (r) −
< 0.
1 + Ĝ0 (αr + Rnot free (r, α))
∂
∂r



Thus, if the derivative of (15) is negative at r0 ∈ [rfree , rnot free ] then (15) is decreasing for all r ∈ [r0 , rnot free ]. Together with Step 1, this implies the following.
In case (i), there exists r ∈ [rfree , rnot free ) such that free contracts are offered in an
∗

optimal scheme if and only if r ∈ [ CF
, r]. In case (ii), the current analysis shows
1−α
that it is optimal to offer free contracts for all r ∈ [rfree , rnot free ], so free contracts
∗

are offered if and only if r ∈ [ CF
, r], where r is the variable that we defined in
1−α
Step 1.
• Let

CF ∗
1−α



∈ rfree , rnot free . In that case, offering free contracts is not optimal for

any r < rnot free . Then, either free contracts are not optimal for any r or by the
same argument as above, if free contracts are not used in an optimal scheme for
r = r0 then they are not used in any optimal scheme for any r > r0 . This proves
the desired claim for this case.
• If

CF ∗
1−α

> rnot free , then offering free contracts is not optimal for any r < rfree . For

10



r ∈ rfree , rnot free free contracts are also not optimal because

1>

∗ )) − R] · G(r + R)
∗ ))] · G(r)
maxR∈R [π((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH
[π((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH
≥
∗ )) − R] · G(αr + R)
∗ )) − R] · G(αr + R) .
maxR∈R [π((0, 0), (p∗H , qH
maxR∈R [π((0, 0), (p∗H , qH

The first inequality follows from the proof of part 2 of the current theorem. For
r ≥ rnot free , offering free contracts is never optimal by Step 1.
This concludes the proof.

Proof. (Proposition 7) First, note that we can write the limiting profits as

∗
lim Πfree (r, α) = max(p̃∗H − cqH
+ r − x)G(x) <

α→1

x≥r

∗
lim Πnot free (r, α) = max(p∗H − cqH
+ r − x)G(x).

α→1

x≥r

It follows immediately from part 1 of Theorem 2 that there exist α0 > 0 and  > 0 such that
Πfree (r, α) +  < Πnot free (r, α) for any α ∈ (0, α0 ), hence the limit result as α → 0 holds.
Proof. (Proposition 8) Applying the implicit function theorem to the first-order conditions
of Πfree and Πnot free gives us:
(i)

Rfree (r,α)
∂α

=−

∗ c−v (q)+cq
p∗H −qH
H

−1−Ĝ0 (r+R)

> 0 and

∗
∂Rnot free (r, α)
p∗ − qH
c − rĜ0 (αr + R)
=− H
∂α
−1 − Ĝ0 (r + R)

∗
which is strictly greater than zero if and only if rĜ0 (αr + Rnot free (r, α)) < p∗H − qH
c, or

αrĜ0 (αr + Rnot free (r, α)) < Πclassic .
(ii)

Rfree (r,α)
∂r

0

−Ĝ (R+r)
< 0 and
= − −1−
Ĝ0 (R+r)

Rnot

free (r,α)

∂r

0

−αĜ (R+αr)
< 0 because Ĝ0 (x) > 0 for
= − −1−
Ĝ0 (R+αr)

all x > 0, so −1 − Ĝ0 (x) < 0.
(iii) First, note that for r > rfree , referral rewards are always zero when free contracts are
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offered, i.e., the statement is trivially true. If r ≤ rfree , then the optimal reward with free
contracts Rfree (r, α) satisfies the first-order condition:

∗
Rfree (r, α) = π((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH
)) −

G(r + Rfree (r, α))
.
g(r + Rfree (r, α))

(16)

By the first-order condition for the maximization problem for the case with no free contracts
with respect to the reward, the solution Rnot free (r, α) must satisfy:

g(αr + R

not free



G(αr + Rnot free (r, α))
∗
∗
not free
(r, α)) · π((0, 0), (pH , qH )) − R
(r, α) −
= 0.
g(αr + Rnot free (r, α))

Since g(·) > 0, this implies that

∗
π((0, 0), (p∗H , qH
)) − Rnot free (r, α) −

G(αr + Rnot free (r, α))
= 0.
g(αr + Rnot free (r, α))

(17)

Now, substitute Rnot free (r, α) by the expression for Rfree (r, α) given by (16) on the left hand
side of (17), to obtain:

∗
∗
π((0, 0), (p∗H , qH
)) − π((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH
)) +

G(r + Rfree (r, α)) G(αr + Rfree (r, α))
−
.
g(r + Rfree (r, α))
g(αr + Rfree (r, α))

∗
This is strictly positive by log-concavity of G (Assumption 4) and because π((0, 0), (p∗H , qH
)) >
∗
)). Noting that the left hand side of (17) is strictly decreasing in referral
π((0, q), (p̃∗H , qH

rewards, the optimal reward without free contracts Rnot free (r, α) is strictly greater than
Rfree (r, α).
Proof. (Proposition 9) The comparative statics with respect to

CF ∗
1−α

are straightforward

from the formula of CF ∗ . The ones for rfree follow from the first-order condition with respect
to rewards that appears in the proof of Lemma 5 and Assumption 4.
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B.4

Homogeneous Costs as the Limit of Heterogeneous Costs

n
Consider a sequence {Gn }∞
1 that converges pointwise to (4) such that for each n, G is twice

differentiable with (Gn )0 (ξ) = g n (ξ) > 0 for all ξ, and Assumption 4 holds. Let the set of
all such sequences be G. The set G is nonempty. For example, consider {Gn }∞
1 such that or
each n ∈ N, Gn is a normal distribution with mean ξ¯ ≥ 0 and variance

1
n

truncated at ξ = 0.

n
free,n
n
,
By inspection one can check that {Gn }∞
1 ∈ G. For any given G , we can define r , r

r̄n , and rnot free,n . Then, the following statement can be shown: For any {Gn }∞
1 ∈ G,
lim rn =

n→∞

CF ∗
,
1−α

¯
lim rfree,n = ξ,

n→∞

lim r̄n =

n→∞
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ξ − CF ∗
,
α

and

lim rnot free,n =

n→∞

ξ¯
.
α

